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COMMENT
THE TREATMENT OF PRESUMPTIONS IN ILLINOIS:
ADDING INSULT TO INJURY?
Presumptions I are rules of law that accept proof of a particular fact
or set of facts as establishing the existence of a second fact, despite
the absence of direct proof of the presumed fact. 2 Although a party
who has the burden of proof 3 in a trial may be aided in establishing a
claim or defense by operation of a presumption, the usefulness of
presumptions is somewhat curtailed by the long-standing confusion
that has existed in this area. In Illinois, the absence of well-reasoned
decisions has contributed to the confusion. 4  Some presumption deci-
1. Although presumptions exist in both the criminal and civil context, this Comment will
focus on civil presumptions. For an excellent treatment of the entire field, see C. MCCORMICK,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 342-46 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972 [hereinafter cited as MCCOR-
MICK]. For an extensive survey of Illinois civil and criminal presumptions see R. HUNTER,
TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR ILLINOIS LAWYERS 441-75 (4th ed. 1972).
As one commentator noted, "The legal force of a presumption is then the additional weight
given by it to data not in itself of sufficient probative force to permit or require the jury to find
the existence of the fact presumed." Comment, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law
Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 307, 313 (1920) [hereinafter cited as Bohlen].
This is Professor Bohlen's student work, in which he mounted the first critical review of
Thayer's bursting bubble theory. In this same work Bohlen proposed the presumption-by-pre-
sumption theory. See notes 72-77 and accompanying text infra.
2. McElroy v. Force, 38 I11. 2d 528, 532-33, 232 N.E.2d 708, 710 (1967).
3. The concept of burden of proof encompasses two components: burden of production and
burden of persuasion. The former requires a party to produce evidence sufficient to establish a
prima facie case. See note 49 infra. The latter requires a party to prove the issue by convincing
the fact finder. In civil cases, the party bearing the burden of persuasion has to convince the
fact finder either by a preponderance of the evidence or by a higher standard requiring clear
and convincing evidence. See J. WIGMORE, 9 A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2494 at 293 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE]; MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 783-84.
Some confusion has existed in the use of the term "burden of proof." Some Illinois courts
have used this term to refer to the persuasion burden while others use it to refer to both
burdens. Compare Donovan v. St. Joseph's Home, 295 I11. 125, 130-31 (1920) (in which the
court explained the duality of the concept) with McElroy v. Force, 38 I11. 2d 528, 532, 232
N.E.2d 708, 710 (1920) (in which the court used the term burden of proof to refer to the
persuasion burden).
4. Indicative of the confusion is the fact that three commentators have stated divergent
views regarding Illinois courts' perception of the procedural effect of presumptions. The first
credits Illinois courts with utilizing a variety of procedural effects for presumptions which in-
clude the Morgan and bursting bubble theories discussed infra, although admitting that they
only acknowledge the bursting bubble theory. Comment, Illinois Presumptions and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 49 Nw. U. L. REV. 657 (1954). The second suggests a modern trend of
reliance on the Morgan theory. E. CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE 59 (2d ed.
1963) [hereinafter cited as CLEARY]. The third and most recent article asserts that Illinois does
not recognize presumptions but only inferences which they term presumptions. Graham, Pre-
sumptions in Civil Cases in Illinois: Do they Exist?, 1977 S. ILL. U.L.J. 1.
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sions have failed to define clearly the scope of presumptions,5 and
others have allocated procedural effects to different presumptions
without clearly articulating reasons for doing so. 6  In addition, deci-
sions often purport to assign one procedural effect while in fact as-
signing another. 7
In this area of law, clear reasoning is indispensable because of the
great diversity of presumptions,8 the complex reasons underlying the
creation of particular presumptions, 9 and the several procedural ef-
fects potentially attributable to different presumptions. 10 Only fully
elaborated decisions will give the necessary guidance to practitioners.
However, the most recent Illinois Supreme Court decision on this
subject, Diederich v. Walters," does not establish a clear directive
concerning the procedural effects of presumptions. Indeed, the deci-
sion reveals the same lack of reasoned elaboration typical of prior
cases. The Diederich court's analysis is neither wholly consistent with
past Illinois case law nor reconcilable with any other available theory
suggesting an appropriate function for presumptions.
The purpose of this Comment is to explore the practical and
theoretical problems that presumptions generate. A presentation of
the four major theories that define presumptions and designate their
procedural effect will form the basis for an examination of past Illinois
experience with the law of presumptions and the rationale of
Diederich v. Walters. The Comment suggests that the Illinois Su-
preme Court must clarify its approach in order to provide real guid-
ance to trial courts, and proposes the adoption of the presumption-by
presumption theory.
I. THE NATURE AND PROCEDURAL EFFECT OF PRESUMPTIONS
Much of the confusion which has characterized the field of pre-
sumptions results from the indefinite scope attributed to the term
"presumption." 12 The inclusion of inferences and substantive rules
5. See notes 79-88 and accompanying text infra. See also Graham, Presumptions in Civil
Cases: Do they Exist?, 1977 S. ILL. U.L.J. 1.
6. See notes 89-98 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 99-101 and accompanying text infra.
8. It is impossible to give the exact number of presumptions that exist in Illinois. A low
estimate would be approximately seventy-five. CLEARY, supra note 4, at 59-69; R. HUNTER,
TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR ILLINOIs LAWYERS 441-71 (4th ed. 1972).
9. See notes 20-28 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 49-78 and accompanying text infra.
11. 65 Ill. 2d 95, 357 N.E.2d 1128 (1976).
12. Problems arise because courts fail to recognize that not all decisions which use the
phrases "there is the presumption" or "it is presumed" are pronouncing the existence of a
presumption. Bohlen, supra note 1, at 310. The courts fall prey to what Cleary has called "the
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of law within the presumption category has contributed to the prob-
lem. 13 A clear understanding of the scope of the term is essential.
As rules of law, presumptions draw mandatory connections be-
tween facts which enable a party to establish a prima facie case.14 If
a party can prove the basic facts necessary to raise a particular pre-
sumption, an additional, unproved fact will be recognized. 15 For in-
stance, in a contract action an insured might resort to the use of a
presumption where an insurance company, as a defense to payment
on the policy, denies receipt of the premium mailed by the in-
sured. 16 In most situations, receipt would be within the sole knowl-
edge of the defendant insurance company, and no direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence would be available to the plaintiff to avoid a
directed verdict. The plaintiff's proof that the letter was properly ad-
dressed and posted constitutes the basic facts giving rise to the pre-
sumption of receipt. 17  Yet, because presumptions are rebuttable,
their impact on the case might be only temporary.' 8 The defendant,
fallacy of the transplanted category." He explains that the "persistent use of the term presump-
tion to describe these nonpresumption situations must inevitably lead to difficulty, in view of
the natural assumption that things of the same name have the same characteristics." CLEARY,
supra note 4, at 60. See also, Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52
MICH. L. REV. 195, 196 (1953).
13. One commentator has recently suggested that the failure of some Illinois courts to dis-
tinguish between inferences and presumptions presents the possibility that presumptions, as
generally defined, do not exist in Illinois. See Graham, Presumptions in Civil Cases in Illinois:
Do They Exist?, 1977 S. ILL. U.L.J. 1.
14. McElroy v. Force, 38 11. 2d 528, 531, 232 N.E.2d 708, 710 (1967). See generally, B.
JONES, 1 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 3.2 (6th ed. S. Gard 1972) [hereinafter cited as JONES]; J.
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON Lw 317 (1898) [hereinaf-
ter cited as THAYER].
15. See, e.g., Lohr v. Barkman Cartage Co., 335 I11. 335, 167 N.E. 35 (1929) (evidence of
agency necessary to raise the presumption that agency relationship was a continuous relation-
ship which existed at the time of the accident); Horst v. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 96 I11.
App. 2d 68, 237 N.E.2d 732 (lst Dist. 1968) (evidence of ownership of involved vehicle was the
necessary condition precedent to presumption that vehicle was operated by the owner's agent).
16. Courts recognize the presumption that mail is presumed to have been delivered if the
sender has not had the mail returned and can also offer proof as to properly addressing the
letter, giving the return address, posting the letter, and affixing the stamp. See e.g., Talmage v.
Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 315 IIl. App. 623, 43 N.E.2d 575 (1st Dist. 1942) (presumption
recognized where letter was sent informing defendant of the beneficiary's address and request-
ing notice of any defaults).
17. See, e.g., Winkfield v. American Continental Ins. Co., 110 Ill. App. 2d 156, 249 N.E.2d
174 (1st Dist. 1969) (acknowledging basic facts but finding insufficient facts existed to raise the
presumption).
18. As soon as contrary evidence is introduced, the presumption's temporary existence is
terminated and the presumption is said to be "overcome." Four different theories suggest the
quantum of evidence that is necessary for this purpose. Under each, the presumption is said to
be rebutted, yet each approach contemplates a different quality and quantity of evidence. In
addition, the theories differ as to whether the rebuttal issue will be decided as a question of law
or a question of fact.
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by introducing contrary evidence, might prove that the letter was
never received. 19
Convenience, 20 fairness,21 probability, 22 policy,23 or a combination
of these considerations 24 may influence a court or legislature to es-
tablish a presumption. A presumption might be created to expedite
the trial process where there is a procedural impasse due to the lack
of evidence, 25 to promote fairness where one party has peculiar ac-
cess to information, 26 or to insure socially desirable results. 27 The
general reliability of the mails as well as the recognition by the courts
that the sender is otherwise unable to prove that the premium was
received, prompted the courts to create the mail presumption. 28
In contrast, inferences exist as the result of the factfinder's own
19. See, e.g., Alger v. Community Amusements Corp., 320 I11. App. 184, 50 N.E.2d 594
(2d Dist. 1943) (mail presumption overcome by the introduction of contrary evidence).
20. See, e.g., Steen v. Modern Woodmen of America, 296 I11. 104, 129 N.E.546 (1920)
(presumption of death after seven years unexplained absence); Mills v. Mills, 27 Ill. App. 2d 50,
169 N.E.2d 177 (2d Dist. 1960) (note which has been due for twenty years without interest
charged or recognition is presumed to have been paid).
21. See, e.g., Bielunski v. Tousignant, 17 I11. App. 2d 359, 149 N.E.2d 801 (2d Dist. 1958)
(bailee presumed negligent for goods damaged while in bailment); Horst v. Morand Bros. Be-
verage Co., 96 I11. App. 2d 68, 237 N.E.2d 732 (1st Dist. 1968) (proof of ownership and that
vehicle was not operated by owner raises presumption that agent was driving vehicle).
22. See, e.g., Breznik v. Braun, 11 I11. 2d 564, 144 N.E.2d 586 (1957) (where a name
appears in several different documents the identity of the named party is presumed to be the
same); Ashley Wire Co. v. Illinois Steel Co., 164 I11. 149, 45 N.E. 410 (1896) (mail presump-
tion).
23. See, e.g., Howard v. People, 193 I11. 615, 61 N.E. 1016 (1901) (presumption that pos-
session of a chattel assumes ownership in order to promote stability of title); Orthwein v.
Thomas, 127 I11. 554, 21 N.E. 430 (1889) (presumption of legitimacy for children born of a
married woman to avoid labeling child illegitimate).
24. Most presumptions actually exist for more than one reason. The mail presumption, for
instance, is based not only on probability of delivery but also on the difficulty of proving re-
ceipt. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 343 at 807-08.
25. See, e.g., Donovan v. Major, 253 I11. 179, 97 N.E. 231 (1911). The Donovan court
recognized that a presumption of death existed after seven years unexplained absence. The
presumption was necessary to determine when death occurs "in order that rights depending
upon the life or death of persons long absent and unheard of may be settled by some certain
rule." Id. at 182, 97 N.E. at 232, quoting Whiting v. Nicoll, 46 I11. 230 (1867).
26. See, e.g., Bielunski v. Tousignant, 17 I11. App. 2d 359, 149 N.E.2d 801 (2d Dist. 1958).
In Bielunski, the court found that the bailee had the best access to information concerning the
cause of the damage to the bailor's goods. It felt that this justified the use of a presumption that
a bailee was negligent for any damages occurring to bailed goods while in the bailee's posses-
sion. Id. at 363, 149 N.E.2d at 804.
27. See, e.g., People ex rel. Gonzalez v. Monroe, 43 I11. App. 2d 1, 192 N.E.2d 691 (2d
Dist. 1963). The Gonzalez court stated that the legitimacy presumption "was conceived for the
purpose of preserving family stability and protecting helpless infants from the stigma of illegiti-
macy." Id. at 6, 192 N.E.2d at 693.
28. See, e.g., Ashley Wire Co. v. Illinois Steel Co., 164 I11. 149, 158, 45 N.E. 410, 413
(1896).
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reasoning process, whereby he or she draws conclusions from one fact
as to the existence of other facts 29 based upon experience, reason and
probability. 30 Inferences are totally permissive conclusions. On the
basis of Fact A one person might infer Fact B, while another person,
with a different series of experiences, might infer Fact C. 31 In the
insurance example, if proof of due mailing did not raise a presump-
tion of receipt, then a person with a negative experience with the
mail service might infer that the premium was never received by the
insurance company. Presumptions and inferences are distinct because
"to prescribe a certain legal equivalence of facts, is a very different
thing from merely allowing meaning to be given to them." 32
Substantive rules of law have been referred to erroneously as ir-
rebuttable or conclusive presumptions. 33 Like presumptions, sub-
stantive rules of law are mandatory connections between facts; 34 but
unlike presumptions, substantive rules of law can never be rebutted
by the introduction of contrary evidence. 35 Equating substantive
rules of law with presumptions will have no consequence in a case in
which the presumption's opponent has not introduced any evidence
contrary to the presumption. In that instance, the presumption func-
tions similarly to a substantive rule of law in that it authorizes a di-
rected verdict on the issue. 36 This similar function may tempt courts
to place both within the same category. However, a distinct treat-
ment is necessary to insure that a presumption which has been over-
come by contrary evidence will not authorize a directed verdict.
37
The concepts of inference, presumptions, and substantive rules of
law have been described as a continuum. 38 For example, James
Thayer reported that the rule of adverse possession began as an infer-
ence. 39  At one time, an open, notorious and unexplained possession
for twenty years gave rise to a mere inference of title. 40  Then a
29. See Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REV. 391, 391-92 (1956).
30. McCo, MICK, supra note 1, § 342 at 803-04.
31. See Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REV. 391, 391-92 (1956).
32. Thayer, Presumptions and the Law of Evidence, 3 HARV. L. REv. 141, 149 (1889).
33. See, e.g., Maskaliunas v. Chicago & W. Ind. R.R., 318 I11. 142, 149, 149 N.E. 23, 26
(1925) (rule that children under seven are incapable of negligence stated as a conclusive pre-
sumption). See CLEARY supra note 4, at 61-62; McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 342 at 804.
34. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, 342 at 804.
35. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 285 I11. 52, 120 N.E. 476 (1918) (no
evidence allowed to rebut presumption that child less than seven is incapable of negligence).
36. See, e.g., Paulsen v. Cochfield, 278 Ill. App. 596, 604 (2d Dist. 1935) (presumption of
agency).
37. WICMOaE, supra note 3, at § 2492.
38. Thayer, Presumptions and the Law of Evidence, 3 HARV. L. REv. 141, 149-50 (1889).
39. Id. at 150.
40. For a general discussion of the law of adverse possession see C. SMITH, SURVEY OF THE
LAw OF PROPERTY 155-70 (2d ed. 1971).
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presumption developed and finally a substantive rule of law
emerged. 41  With substantive law developing in this manner, it is not
surprising that a reading of the case law might produce uncertainty
over whether the courts were applying an inference, a presumption,
or a rule of law.
An additional difference between these concepts that indicates a
need for a separate treatment is the manner in which each operates
within the course of a trial. An available substantive rule of law alone
may be sufficient to enable a party to meet his or her burden of
proof. For instance, in a negligence suit, evidence that a child was
less than seven years old when hit by a car automatically and conclu-
sively establishes that the child lacked the capacity to be contributor-
ily negligent. 42 In the absence, of direct evidence, a party may in-
troduce circumstantial evidence. 43 In that case, the factfinder may
conclude or draw the inference that a particular Fact B is the prob-
able and reasonable result of the existence of Fact A in order to find
that a party has satisfied a particular burden of proof.
Where neither direct nor circumstantial evidence is available, how-
ever, a party may prove an issue only if a presumption intercedes. 4 4
The presumption creates a prima facie 45 case as to that issue. There-
after, the opposing party must introduce contrary evidence in order
to avoid a directed verdict, unless other issues of fact, not involving
the presumption, require the case to go to the jury.46 If the case
41. Thayer, Presumptions and the Law of Evidence, 3 HARV. L. REV. 141, 150 (1889).
42. See, e.g., Dickeson v. Baltimore & Ohio Chi. R.R., 42 Ill.2d 103, 245 N.E.2d 762
(1969).
43. Circumstantial evidence is defined as evidence which,
refers to facts indirectly related to the fact in issue, these circumstances having
been found by experience so associated with that fact that in the relation of cause
and effect they lead to a satisfactory conclusion. For example, when foot prints are
discovered subsequent to a recent snow, it is proper to infer that some animated
being passed over the snow after it fell ...
JONES, supra note 14, § 1.3 at 4. See Ohio Bldg. Safety Vault Co. v. Industrial Bd., 227 III. 96,
110, 115 N.E. 149, 154 (1917).
44. Compare Lohr v. Barkman Cartage Co., 335 Ill. 335, 340, 167 N.E. 35, 37 (1929) with
McElroy v. Force, 38 II. 2d 528, 532, 232 N.E.2d 708, 710 (1967). In Lohr the court stated
that a presumption is used when no evidence exists, while in McElroy the court cited with
approval Robinson v. Workman, 9 Ill. 2d 420, 137 N.E.2d 504 (1956) where the presumption
was utilized although there was circumstantial evidence to support the presumed fact's exis-
tence.
45. Two different meanings have been given to the term "prima facie case." One definition
proposes that there is enough evidence introduced to set out each element of the cause of
action and to withstand a directed verdict. Under this meaning, a prima facie case means that
the burden of production has been met. Under the second definition, the term means that the
evidence is sufficient to shift the ultimate burden of persuasion. The former definition is utilized
for the purposes of this Comment. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 342 at 803; WIGMORE, supra
note 3, § 2494.
46. McCoRM, ICK, supra note 1, § 342 at 803.
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goes to the jury, the court instructs the jurors that if they find that
the basic facts giving rise to the presumption have been proven, then
the presumed fact must also exist.4 7
Considerable debate exists on the quantum of evidence which is
necessary to overcome a presumption and on the issue of what occurs
when contrary evidence is introduced. 48 Four theories have been
formulated to explain the procedural effects of presumptions where
evidence contrary to the presumption has been introduced. They are:
1) the Thayer or bursting bubble theory, 49 2) the modified bursting
bubble theory, 50 3) the Morgan or Pennsylvania theory, 51 and 4) the
presumption-by-presumption theory. 52 These theories differ in the
amount of evidence necessary to overcome the presumption, the pre-
sumption's effect on the burden of proof, and the type of instruction,
if any, to be given concerning the presumption. An analysis of each
major theory will illustrate the differences.
John Thayer's 1889 work 53 represents the starting point for an
analysis of the procedural effect attributed to presumptions. Thayer
47. See, e.g., McElroy v. Force, 38 I1l. 2d 528, 232 N.E.2d 708 (1967) (owner of vehicle
presumed to have driven vehicle); Dunne v. South Shore Country Club, 230 Ill. App. 11 (1st
Dist. 1923) (failure to deliver bailed good raised presumption of negligence).
48. The basic works which explore the procedural effects of presumptions include: THAYER,
supra note 14; Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324 (1952);
Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906 (1931) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Observations]; and Bohlen, supra note 1.
49. The bursting bubble theory was developed by Professor James Thayer, but has been
elaborated upon by Dean Wigmore.
50. Morgan was the first to recognize the existence of seven patterns of departure from the
bursting bubble theory. He noted that where there was evidence sufficient to support a finding
of the nonexistence of the presumption, some courts have required that that evidence be cred-
ited by the trier of fact. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 34 (1963). Although this
deviation has proven to be widely employed by Illinois courts, no one name has been given to
it. For ease of understanding, this approach will be referred to in this Comment as the "mod-
ffied bursting bubble theory."
51. In an early work Morgan approved Bohlen's presumption-by-presumption theory dis-
cussed at notes 73-77 and accompanying text infra. Observations, supra note 48, at 928. How-
ever, he later rejected that theory as impractical and advocated the Pennsylvania theory which
now bears his name. Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 275 (1937); MCCORMICK, supra
note 1, § 345 at 826-27. Because of certain constitutional arguments against that approach, he
conceded that the Thayer theory would probably remain the majority approach and accepted
the modified versions of that theory as expressed in ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 703
and 704 (1942). See Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 245,
265 (1943). He later urged the adoption of a modified version of the modified Pennsylvania
theory. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 14 (1953). See E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF
PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 81 (1956).
52. See Comment, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of
Proof, 68 U. PENN. L. REV. 307 (1920).
53. THAYER, supra note 14.
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reasoned that presumptions were created solely as replacements for
evidence and that the availability of evidence on an issue eliminated
the need for the presumption. 54 Under this theory, proof of the
basic facts creates a prima facie case which shifts the burden of pro-
duction to the opponent but has no effect on the burden of persua-
sion. 55 Accordingly, under this view, a presumption operates only
until the presumption's opponent meets his or her burden of proof by
introducing evidence sufficient to support a finding of the nonexis-
tence of the presumed fact. 56  At that point the presumption is con-
clusively rebutted.
The judge determines whether the evidence offered to contradict
the presumption is sufficient for that purpose. 57 Regardless of
whether the judge considers the evidence credible, he or she must
decide whether the evidence would support a verdict contrary to the
presumption, were the jury to believe it. 58 In this case, the oppo-
nent's burden of proof has been met and the presumption disappears.
No instruction regarding the presumption will be given. 59
Some courts have modified the bursting bubble theory in a signifi-
cant respect, holding that the presumption is overcome only by evi-
dence that is reliable in nature and uncontradicted by direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence. 60 Like the Thayer theory, the "modified
bursting bubble theory"61 recognizes that while the burden of pro-
duction shifts once the presumption is raised, the burden of persua-
sion remains fixed. 62 However, unlike the bursting bubble theory,
54. id. at 339.
55. Id. at 337.
56. Courts do not clearly define what quantum of evidence is necessary. Some indicate that
any evidence introduced will suffice. See, e.g., Coal Creek Drainage & Levee Dist. v. Sanitary
Dist., 336 II1. 11, 31, 167 N.E. 807, 816 (1929) (as soon as evidence is introduced the presump-
tion vanishes). Others note that only believable evidence should rebut the presumption. See,
e.g., Horst v. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 96 Il1. App. 2d 68, 77, 237 N.E.2d 732, 740 (1st
Dist. 1968) (denial of directed verdict for defendant affirmed).
57. See THAYER, supra note 14, at 337-39.
58. See Kitch v. Adkins, 346 i11. App. 342, 105 N.E. 527 (3d Dist. 1952). Presumptions
establish a prima facie case which shifis the burden of production to the opposing party. This is
the test utilized whenever a directed verdict is at issue. It is appropriate because the determi-
nation that the party opposing the presumption has satisfied his or her burden of production is
raised by a motion for directed verdict. Paulsen v. Cochfield, 278 Ill. App. 596 (2d Dist. 1935).
59. See, e.g., Wolf v. Pedian, 251 Ill. App. 564 (1st Dist. 1929) (bailee presumption).
60. See, e.g., Kavale v. Morton Salt Co., 329 I11. 445, 160 N.E. 752 (1928) (defendant's
motion for directed verdict was denied and case sent to the jury despite introduction of evi-
dence); Blodgett v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 32 I11. App. 2d 155, 177 N.E.2d 1 (2d Dist.
1961) (presumption was not overcome as a matter of law although rebuttal evidence was of-
fered).
61. See note 50 supra.
62. See Horst v. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 96 I11. App. 2d 68, 79, 237 N.E.2d 732, 737
(1st Dist. 1968). See also Observations, supra note 48, at 916.
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the modified theory usually reserves the question of whether the pre-
sumption is overcome for the jury. 63  Because the jury considers the
credibility of the evidence heard during the trial, rebuttal evidence
which the jury disbelieves does not overcome the presumption. 64 The
jury is instructed that if they find that the basic facts have been prov-
en, a presumption will be raised which may be successfully rebutted
by the introduction of credible evidence. 65
A third theory, developed by Professor Morgan, suggests that pre-
sumptions should be given a stronger procedural effect than that as-
cribed by either of the bursting bubble theories. 66 Relying on the
important considerations underlying the creation of a presumption, 67
his theory provides that a presumption persists unless the opposing
party proves the nonexistence of the presumed fact by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 68 Consequently, the presumption shifts not
only the burden of production but also the burden of persuasion.
This result can be justified easily. The original allocation of proof
between the parties is set by a court to promote the same goals which
underlie the creation of presumptions. 69 Presumptions are needed
when the original allocation of proof is inadequate to fulfill these
ends. Since common goals are furthered, the allocation of the burden
of persuasion under the Morgan theory is not inappropriate. 70 Under
this theory, instructions are always necessary to inform the jury of the
presumption's existence and its rebuttable nature, 71 because it is the
63. It is possible for a judge to determine that the rebuttal evidence is reliable as a matter
of law because reasonable minds would not differ on that issue. See, e.g., Paulsen v. Cochfield,
278 I11. App. 596 (2d Dist. 1935).
64. See Horst v. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 96 I11. App. 2d 68, 76, 237 N.E.2d 732, 737
(1st Dist. 1968) quoting, Paulsen v. Cochfield, 278 I11. App. 596, 607 (2d Dist. 1935).
65. 96 I11. App. 2d at 78-79, 237 N.E.2d at 737. Although it mistakenly viewed an inference
as a presumption, the court in Horst did utilize the modified bursting bubble approach in its
application of the instruction.
66. See note 51 supra.
67. See notes 20-28 and accompanying text supra.
68. Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 275, 281 (1937); See also Comment, Pre-
sumptions in Civil Cases: Procedural Effects Under Maryland Law in State and Federal
Forums, 5 BALT. L. REV. 301, 307 (1976).
69. McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 343 at 806; Observations, supra note 52, at 929.
70. As Professor McCormick noted:
The principal objection to . . . [shifting the allocation of the burden of proof] has
been that it requires a "'shift" in the burden of persuasion, something that is, by
definition of the burden, impossible. The argument, however, assumes that the
burden of persuasion is fixed at the commencement of the action. This is simply not
the case. As we have seen, the burden of persuasion need not finally be assigned
until the case is ready to go to the jury.
MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 345 at 826-27.
71. See E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF LITIGATION 81 (1956).
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jury's province to decide whether the presumed fact still exists after
the introduction of the contrary evidence.
The fourth theory concerning the procedural effect of presumptions
is called the presumption-by-presumption theory. 72  It is similar to
Morgan's approach in that it awards procedural effect based on the
policy reasons underlying presumptions. 73  However, this theory as-
signs the procedural effect to a particular presumption in accordance
with the importance attached to its purpose. 74 Generally, conveni-
ence and fairness considerations are viewed as less important than
probability or social considerations. 75 Thus, the former are less likely
to require evidence that is credible or uncontradicted to overcome
the presumption. Under this approach, some presumptions will be
destroyed by any contrary evidence, others by believable evidence
and still others by proof that is more probable than not. 76  The vari-
ety of procedural effects utilized obviously will be evidenced by a
variety of instructions. 77
72. See note 52 supra.
73. Bohlen, supra note 1, at 313. Thayer acknowledged that presumptions exist for a variety
of reasons but his theory does not reflect these different purposes because it accords all pre-
sumptions the same procedural effect. THAYER, supra note 14, at 314.
74. Bohlen, supra note 1, at 313-21.
75. Professor Morgan has suggested in his early work that the considerations underlying
presumptions must be balanced against any pleading considerations. Presumptions based on
probability which are raised in a case where there are counteracting considerations of incon-
venience or policy should only provide a prima facie case. All other presumptions at least
should have the effect of being rebutted by evidence which is actually rated by the jury. This
would mean that the presumption's purpose would not be sacrificed because of evidence which
no trier of fact would believe. In other instances, the nonexistence of the presumed fact should
be proved by requiring the presumption's opponent to carry the burden of persuasion on that
issue. The burden of persuasion should be allocated to the presumption's opponent: 1) where
the presumption is based on probability and no convenience or policy considerations exist; 2)
where a convenience based presumption is not countered by a policy consideration; 3) where a
socially desirable presumption exists; and 4) where two or more presumptions exist in a party's
favor. Observations, note 48 supra, at 924-34.
76. See, e.g., Bond v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 315 Mo. 987, 288 S.W. 777 (1926). The
Bond court determined that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as applied when the defendant is a
common carrier was based on the public policy of the state to protect passengers. Id. at 1003,
288 S.W. at 783. Having made this determinatibn, the court held the rule in some presumption
cases that the burden of persuasion did not shift when a presumption was raised inappropriately.
Id. Instead, the court shifted the burden of persuasion which it erroneously termed the burden
of proof. The court seemed to imply that it was possible that presumptions could have divergent
effects. Thus the court accepted the presumption-by-presumption approach although not by
name. The court stated that if a presumption was "a mere rule of procedure, then when all the
evidence is in it would be proper to instruct the jury that the burden is upon the plaintiff to
show by the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant was negligent." Id.
77. Although it should be obvious that instructions are the practical example of the im-
plementation of presumptions, courts have made the mistake of assigning one effect to a case
and then granting an instruction which is inconsistent with that effect. See notes 99-101 and
accompanying text infra.
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In order to illustrate these theories, it will be helpful to reconsider
the insurance policy situation. The plaintiff raises the presumption
that the premium was received by the defendant insurance company
by introducing evidence of proper mailing of the premium check.
Under the various presumption theories, different results will occur if
the defendant company brings in the mail clerk to deny receipt of the
premium. Under the bursting bubble theory this evidence will be
sufficient to conclusively rebut the presumption. Because the mail
clerk's testimony is probably inherently incredible, the modified
bursting bubble theory would leave this issue for the jury to deter-
mine. Morgan would also send the question of rebuttal to the jury
but thereafter the presumption would remain in the case unless it
was found by the jury to be false by a preponderance of the evidence.
Under the presumption-by-presumption approach, the court would
inquire into the purpose of the presumption and find that the pre-
sumption was based upon considerations of probability and fairness.
Consequently, the presumption probably would not disappear when
the defendant introduced incredible, self-serving testimony. Rather,
the court would hold that the presumption can only be .destroyed by
evidence which is credible and uncontradicted. 78
II. PAST ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE WITH PRESUMPTIONS
Illinois cases reflet neither clear nor consistent treat-
ment of presumptions. These decisions illustrate the type of con-
fusion generated from the lack of precise terminology and analysis.
For instance, in Ohio Vault Building Safety Co. v. Industrial
Board, 79 the Illinois Supreme Court found that inferences and pre-
sumptions were synonomous and, accordingly, awarded them similar
treatment. 80 Although the case actually involved the use of an infer-
ence, the court's real failure was that it did not perceive the permis-
sive character of inferences in contrast to the mandatory nature of
presumptions.81 Other decisions do not explicitly accept the Ohio
Vault position, but nevertheless mistake inferences for presump-
tions. 82
78. See, e.g., Talmage v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 315 Il. App. 623, 43 N.E.2d 575 (1st
Dist. 1942).
79. 277 I11. 96, 115 N.E. 149 (1917).
80. Id. at 110-11, 115 N.E. at 155.
81. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
82. See, e.g., Shelvin v. Jackson, 5 I11. 2d 43, 124 N.E.2d 895 (1955) (presumption of san-
ity); Tepper v. Campo, 398 I11. 496, 76 N.E.2d 490 (1948) (presumption that the failure to
produce evidence at trial implies the absence of available evidence); Coal Creek Drainage Dist.
v. Sanitary Dist., 336 I11. 11, 167 N.E. 807 (1929) (presumption that once a condition has been
proven to exist at one point in time it will continue to exist in the future).
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Even those decisions which do recognize the conceptual distinction
between inferences and presumptions have not abandoned the posi-
tion that inferences are included within the term "presumption." 8
For example, in Cobb v. Marshall Field & Co., 84 the appellate court
was faced with the question of whether the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur existed as an inference or a presumption. It concluded that
an "inference of negligence," instead of a presumption, arose from
the introduction of circumstantial evidence, but the court continued
to call the inference a presumption. 8 Admittedly, the Cobb decision
is consistent with one now discredited distinction: that an inference
was a presumption of fact and that the other was a presumption of
law. 86 However, this approach has been rejected in favor of the use
of separate terms in order to promote clarity. 87 If separate terms are
used, it is suggested, courts will not be tempted to combine the func-
tions of these two concepts.
Because of decisions like Ohio Vault and Cobb, courts have trouble
ascertaining whether an inference, presumption or substantive rule of
law has been raised. As a result, courts often place themselves in the
untenable position of having to apply presumption law to what is ac-
tually an inference. In addition, because inferences are often called
presumptions, much of the case law which emerges suggests the pro-
cedural effect for inferences, not presumptions. Under this cir-
cumstance, a judge might find a true presumption difficult to imple-
ment properly. 88
In addition, courts exhibit a general lack of detailed analysis. 8 9
Some decisions rely upon dicta, demonstrating no effort by the courts
83. Compare Sheldon v. Wright, 80 Vt. 298, 67 A. 807 (1907) (court cautioned against in-
cluding inference within presumption category) with Cobb v. Marshall Field & Co., 22 I11. App.
2d 143, 159 N.E.2d 520 (1st Dist. 1959).
84. 22 Ill. App. 2d 143, 159 N.E.2d 520 (1st Dist 1959).
85. Id. at 155, 159 N.E.2d at 525.
86. See TIHAYER, supra note 14, at 339. See generally Bohlen, supra note 1.
87. Modern commentators usually reject this concept because "in most instances, the appli-
cation of any label to an inference will only cause confusion." See 1 JONES, supra note 14, § 3.2
at 128. McCORMICK, supra note 1, § 342 at 804. Interestingly, Professor McCormick once held
the position that presumptions should be considered in terms of mandatory and permissive
presumptions, but now rejects that position. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 342 at 804 n.31.
88. See, e.g., Graves v. Colwell, 90 II1. 612 (1878).
89. See, e.g., Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539, 173 N.E. 670 (1930) overruled, Metz
v. Central Ill. Elec. & Gas Co., 32 Ill. 2d 446, 207 N.E.2d 305 (1965). This is a serious defect.
Courts must present authority for their decisions because "all official power can properly be
thought of as limited by a general prohibition against arbitrariness in its exercise." H. HART &
A. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 175 (1953). In the absence of a record of the considerations
relied upon by a court, this prohibition against arbitrariness is difficult to administer. Generally,
courts are under the obligation to use reasoned elaboration. This means,
first of all, that the magistrate is obliged to resolve the issue before him on the
assumption that the answer will be the same in all like cases. . . . Secondly, the
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to direct an inquiry at the particular presumption under the particular
fact situation.90  Other courts do distinguish the particular presump-
tion from other presumptions but fail to explain the reasoning behind
the distinction. 91
Res ipsa loquitur cases illustrate both situations.9 2 In Bollenbach
v. Bloomenthal,93 the 1930 Illinois Supreme Court relied upon the
general body of presumption law, including dicta, to conclude that
the presumption was rebutted by the introduction of contrary evi-
dence. 94  The court did not inquire whether res ipsa was in fact a
presumption rather than an inference. However, assuming the valid-
ity of the characterization, the court did not decide whether, res ipsa
warranted the same procedural effect found appropriate for other pre-
sumptions.
In 1965, Metz v. Central Illinois Electric and Gas Co., 95 overruled
Bollenbach. There, the state supreme court concluded that the prima
facie case of negligence created by res ipsa did not disappear when
contrary evidence was introduced. Rather, the jury was required to
weigh all of the evidence to determine whether in fact the prima facie
case was overcome. The court asserted that this result was "just" but
did not explain why. 96 Had it analyzed the doctrine involved, it
might have accepted the Cobb court's conclusion that res ipsa
loquitur arose as an inference. 97 This distinction would have been
consistent with the court's treatment in Metz, because the court held
that the jury was to evaluate the probative value of the circumstantial
evidence, which is the precise manner in which any inference should
be treated. 98
A further weakness in Illinois presumption decisions is that they
often are internally inconsistent. Graves v. Colwell, 99 an early pre-
magistrate is obliged to relate his decision in some reasoned fashion. . . . He is not
to think of himself as in the same position as a legislator ...
Id. at 161. In addition, because decisional law is directive in nature in that it speaks to the
future, decisions must clearly state the court's reasoning as a guide to future courts. The
Diederich decision is inadequate in this respect.
90. See, e.g., Lohr v. Barkmann Cartage Co., 335 II1. 335, 167 N.E. 35 (1929).
91. See, e.g., Metz v. Central I11. Elec. & Gas Co., 32 I11. 2d 446, 207 N.E.2d 305 (1965).
92. For a general discussion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur see W. PROSSEB, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 211-35 (4th ed. 1971).
93. 341 Ill. 539, 173 N.E. 670 (1930).
94. Id. at 548, 173 N.E. at 673.
95. 32 II. 2d 446, 207 N.E.2d 305 (1965).
96. Id. at 449, 207 N.E.2d at 307.
97. See notes 84-85 and accompanying text supra.
98. See, e.g., Marian v. Lena Pellett Co., 120 I11. App.2d 131, 256 N.E.2d 93 (2d Dist.
1970).
99. 90 111. 612 (1898).
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sumption case, affords probably the clearest example. Graves in-
volved the issue of whether the name of a grantee on a deed referred
to a father or son, whose names were the same. The court stated that
a presumption existed that the father was the grantee and that the
presumption could be rebutted by the introduction of contrary evi-
dence. 100 Significantly, the implication was that the judge would
make this determination as a matter of law. However, when the son
introduced contrary evidence, the court approved an instruction
which stated that in order to be successful the son's rebuttal evidence
had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the deed was
made to the son and not the father. 1 1
III. Diederich v. Walters: THE CASE IN PERSPECTIVE
The Illinois Supreme Court recently was confronted with an oppor-
tunity to correct the past inadequacies in the presumption field in
Diederich v. Walters. '2 Although the decision does represent an
improvement over past decisions, Diederich did not meet the chal-
lenge it was offered: to provide a rational explanation for prior cases
and a proper treatment of presumptions for the future. In addition,
the court could have used Diederich to clarify the status of the child's
presumption raised in the case.103 In order to prompt a future deci-
sion that will end the confusion in presumption cases, it is important
to indicate precisely where Diederich fell short.
Diederich involved a wrongful death action arising out of the death
of a thirteen year old in a pedestrian-automobile accident. 1°4 The
plaintiff, by producing evidence of the decedent's age at the time of
his death, raised the presumption that a child between the ages of
seven and fourteen lacks the capacity to be negligent. 10 5 Because
100. Id. at 615.
101. Id. at 618.
102. 65 II1. 2d 95, 357 N.E.2d 1128 (1976).
103. As an indication of the need for reform compare American Natl. Bank v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 52 II1. App. 2d 406, 202 N.E.2d 79 (1st Dist. 1965) (an instruction was necessary so that
the jury could determine whether the introduction of evidence of the child's capacity had con-
clusively rebutted the presumption) with Strasma v. Lemke, vol. 111 111. App. 2d 377, 250
N.E.2d 305 (Ist Dist. 1969) (the presumption may be overcome by evidence of the child's
conduct if the jury is instructed to consider the mental capacity and experience of the child in
determining whether the child's conduct was negligent.
104. Richard Diederich and two school friends were walking along a dimly lit rural highway
on the way to a school dance when the accident occurred. The trio had been walking with the
traffic on the road, stepping off to the side of the road whenever an infrequent car passed.
Young Diederich did not move off the road as defendant's car approached and was consequently
struck and kiiled by defendant's automobile. 65 I11. 2d at 97-98, 357 N.E.2d at 1129.
105. This presumption is one of three rules utilized by Illinois courts to afford special treat-
ment to children. All of these rules stem from the criminal law concept that age is a valid factor
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the presumption established the plaintiff's prima facie case on the
issue of due care, he sought a jury instruction that the presumption
was in operation. 1'6
In affirming the trial court's refusal to permit the instruction as to
the presumption, 10 7 the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed two of the
available theories that designate the procedural effect of presump-
tions. 10 8 Although the court acknowledged the Morgan theory, it
for gauging the capacity of children. Three age classifications exist: cbildren below the age of
seven are held incapable of negligence as a matter of law; children' itwieen the ages of seven
and fourteen are rebuttably presumed to be incapable; and children oven'the age of fourteen are
rebuttably presumed capable. See Mackaliunas v. Chicago & W. Ind. R.R., 318 I11. 142, 149
N.E. 23 (1925). See generally Note, Contributory Negligence of Children, 18 S.C. L. REV. 648
(1966); Note, Torts-Minors-Contributory or Comparative Negligence, 39 TENN. L. REV. 747
(1972). For the purpose of this Comment, the presumption involved in Diederich will be refer-
red to as the child's presumption.
106. The plaintiff's instruction stated: "Since the decedent, Richard Diederich, was under
the age of 14 at the time of the occurrence, there is a presumption that he was free from
contributory negligence." 65 I11. 2d at 99, 357 N.E.2d at 1130.
107. 65 I11. 2d at 103, 357 N.E.2d at 1132. The trial court rejected the plaintiff's instruction
and sent the issue to the jury without the benefit of the presumption. The use of a presumption
instruction, it held, was inconsistent with the defendant's introduction of evidence to prove
negligence. Id. at 103, 357 N.E.2d at 1132. The court did tender two instructions concerning
the decedent's contributory negligence. The court stated:
A minor is not held to the same standard of conduct as an adult. When I use the
words "ordinary care" with respect to the decedent, I mean that degree of care
which a reasonably careful minor of the age, mental capacity and experience of the
decedent would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.
The law does not say how such a minor would act under those circumstances. That
is for you to decide.
The rule I have just stated also applies when a minor is charged with having
violated a statute. There was in force in the State of Illinois at the time of the
occurrence in question a certain statute which provided:
(a) Any person walking along and upon improved highways shall keep on the left of
the paved portion or on the left shoulder thereof and upon meeting a vehicle
while walking on such paved portion shall step off to the left.
If you decide that the plaintiff's decedent violated the statute on the occasion in
question, then you may consider that fact together with all other facts and cir-
cumstances in evidence in determining whether or not the plaintiff's decedent was
contributorily negligent before and at the time of the occurrence.
Id. at 99-100, 357 N.E.2d at 1130.
The appellate court had reversed the trial court on the basis that the instruction on the
ordinary care of the minor was inadequate to inform the jury of the contributory negligence
presumption. Citing past Illinois decisions dealing with this presumption, the court concluded
that a finding of negligence was not adequate to rebut the presumption. Rather, evidence of the
child's capacity and intelligence was necessary for that purpose. Diederich v. Walters, 31 I11.
App. 3d 594, 334 N.E.2d 283 (2d Dist. 1975).
108. The court referred to Jones and Wigmore, noted evidence text writers, to establish the
existence of two major approaches to presumptions. 1 JONES, supra note 14, § '3.8; 9 WIGMORE,
supra note 3, § 2491 at 289. For a discussion of the procedural effects in the presumption field
see MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 822; Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VANO.
L. REV. 324, 333 (1952).
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concluded that the majority or bursting bubble theory was consistent
with both the trial court's ruling and past Illinois decisions. 10 9 In so
doing, the court did not explicitly hold that the bursting bubble
theory should govern all presumptions, but the court's language and
its failure to focus solely on the child's presumption supports the con-
clusion that it was rendering a general rule for Illinois presumptions.
The court stated that a trial judge has discretion on the issue of
whether to instruct the jury as to the existence of a presumption; and
because the court found no clear cut abuse of discretion, it affirmed
the lower court's decision."x 0
Although Diederich's analysis is more thorough than other deci-
sions, the court failed to discuss -all the available procedural ef-
fects."' Moreover, the opinion may have compounded previous
problems. First, by stating that "the prevailing view that a presump-
tion ceases to operate in the face of contrary evidence has generally
been followed in Illinois," 112 the court impliedly accepted the burst-
ing bubble theory for all presumptions. The court cited numerous
decisions for the proposition that a presumption is destroyed by any
evidence introduced to contradict the presumed fact. 113 However,
the court did not carefully analyze these cases. Specifically, the court
failed to discern that several of the decisions involved inferences 114
rather than true presumptions. The 'court further failed to note that
the language in all but three of these cases, 115 referring to the pre-
109. The court supported its conclusion that Illinois accepted the majority view by extracting
statements from a number of Illinois decisions that reviewed the use of presumptions. 65 II1. 2d
at 102-03, 357 N.E.2d at 1131-32.
110. Id. at 100, 357 N.E.2d at 1130. The court stated:
The determination of whether a jury should be instructed as to the existence of a
presumption must be made by a trial court in the context of the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case with reference to the applicable law, the evidence, other
instructions, and the particular nature and effect of the presumption itself.
111. The Diederich court mentioned the bursting bubble and Morgan theories, referring to
them as the majority and minority theories in this area. Past Illinois courts have discussed only
the bursting bubble theory. No cases have recognized the existence of all other theories re-
viewed in this Comment. Nevertheless, the cases have permitted the procedural effects
suggested by these theories.
112. 65 111. 2d at 102, 357 N.E.2d at 1131.
113. Id. The cases discussed in Diederich are collected in notes 114-116 infra.
114. See Miller v. Pettengill, 392 II1. 117, 63 N.E.2d 735 (1945); Coal Creek Drainage &
Levee Dist. v. Sanitary Dist., 336 I11. 11, 167 N.E. 807 (1929).
Justice Goldenhersh, in his dissent, rejected the majority's reliance on the cited cases because
they involved a variety of presumptions. He noted that the majority erred because it "at-
tempted to apply the same rule to all presumptions whereas it is clear from the decisions of this
court that all presumptions are not alike." 65 Ill. 2d at 106, 257 N.E.2d at 1132.
115. Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 II1. 539, 173 N.E. 670 (1930) (uncontradicted tes-
timony); Lohr v. Barkman Cartage Co., 335 I11. 335, 167 N.E. 35 (1929) (uncontradicted evi-
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sumption's appropriate procedural effect, constituted dicta because
the outcome did not rest upon procedural effect." 6
By advocating the use of the majority theory for Illinois presump-
tions, Diederich failed to recognize and accommodate the diversity of
procedural effects utilized in prior Illinois decisions. For instance, in
one prior case, 117 although the opposing party introduced contrary
evidence, the judge did not find that the presumption had been over-
come as a matter of law."i 8 Rather, the court reasoned that because
of the material contradictions in the testimony, the question of rebut-
tal was an issue of fact for the jury. 119 The judge explained that the
jury was "not required to believe such witness even though such con-
tradiction of his testimony has not been direct." 120 The court im-
plied that the presumption would remain effective unless evidence
had been introduced which the jury believed. The court's approach
was consistent with the modified bursting bubble theory and not
Thayer's version. Had the court strictly applied the Thayer theory,
the presumption would have disappeared from the case after the in-
troduction of any contrary evidence.
In a later case, 121 an appellate court employed the procedural ef-
fect suggested by Morgan in lieu of the bursting bubble approach.
dence); Osborne v. Osborne, 325 II1. 229, 156 N.E. 306 (1927) (inherently reliable divorce
decree offered as rebuttal evidence).
116. Questions of the existence of a presumption after the introduction of contrary evidence
arise in the context of motions for directed verdict and validity of jury instructions. Discussions
of presumptions in other contexts constitute dicta. In citing the following cases the Diederich
court was relying on dicta. McElroy v. Force, 38 I11. 2d 528, 232 N.E. 2d 708 (1967) (no
rebuttal evidence); Trustees of Schools v. Lilly, 373 I11. 431, 26 N.E.2d 489 (1940) (no rebuttal
evidence); Brown v. Brown, 329 I11. 198, 160 N.E. 149 (1928) (rebuttal evidence was only
contradicted by self-serving testimony of party promoting the presumption); Johnson v. Pender-
gast, 308 I11. 255, 139 N.E. 407 (1923) (self-serving rebuttal evidence existed, but decision was
unclear on question of whether this rebutted the presumption or not); Morrison v. Flowers, 308
II1. 189, 139 N.E. 10 (1923) (no rebuttal evidence); Helbig v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 234 I11. 251, 84
N.E. 897 (1908) (self-serving testimony).
117. Kavale v. Morton Salt Co., 329 Ill. 445, 160 N.E. 752 (1928). Kavale involved the
presumption that a vehicle is presumed to have been operated by an agent of the owner of the
vehicle even though the owner was not operating the vehicle at the time of the accident. This
presumption is raised upon proof of ownership. See, e.g., McElroy v. Force, 38 I11. 2d 528, 232
N.E.2d 708 (1967).
118. 329 I11. at 451, 160 N.E. at 754.
119. Id. at 452, 160 N.E. at 754.
120. Id.
121. Brenton v. Sloan's United Storage & Van Co., 315 I11. App. 278, 42 N.E.2d 945 (4th
Dist. 1942). In Brenton the plaintiffs sought recovery for damages to furniture and household
goods which, while held in bailment by the defendant, were destroyed in a fire. This fact raised
the presumption that the bailee's negligence caused the damage. The defendant bailee testified
that he had no knowledge of the cause of the fire which damaged the plaintiff's goods and that
fire precautions had been taken by the storage company prior to the fire. The court found that
the jury was not incorrect in determining that such a showing did not overcome the presump-
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The court held that a presumption existed in the case which placed a
burden on the defendant to explain the circumstances surrounding
the loss of the plaintiff's goods while held in bailment by the defen-
dant. l2 2  The court reasoned that the presumption should remain in
effect until the "defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that it exercised ordinary care and diligence to prevent de-
struction and loss to the property" 123 owned by the plaintiff.
In a line of cases concerning the legitimacy of children, Illinois
courts have deviated further from the bursting bubble approach. 124 In
each of these cases, although contrary evidence was introduced which
might have persuaded the jury, the courts refused to find that the
presumption had been overcome unless clear and convincing evi-
dence was offered. 125
Even assuming that the bursting bubble theory suggested the pro-
per procedural effect to use in Diederich, the supreme court incor-
rectly instructed courts as to how to use the theory. The court erred
in two respects: first, by calling for a discretionary use of instructions;
and second, by failing to establish guidelines for the exercise of this
discretion. The Diederich decision suggested that trial courts look at
the "facts and circumstances of each case with reference to the
applicable law, the evidence, other instructions, and the particular
nature and procedural effect of the presumption itself. "126 in order to
tion. Id. at 283, 42 N.E.2d at 947. See also Miles v. International Hotel Co., 289 I11. 320, 124
N.E. 599 (1919); Bieluoski v. Tousignant, 17 I11. App. 2d 359, 149 N.E.2d 801 (2nd Dist. 1958);
Capital Dairy Co. v. All States Auto Body Builders, 339 I11. App. 395, 90 N.E.2d 278 (1st Dist.
1950).
122. 315 I1. App. at 283, 42 N.E.2d at 947.
123. Id.
124. See Orthwein v. Thomas, 127 I11. 554, 21 N.E. 430 (1889); People ex rel. Jones v.
Schmitt, 101 I11. App. 2d 183, 242 N.E.2d 275 (3d Dist. 1968); People ex rel. Gonzalez v.
Monroe, 43 I11. App. 2d 1, 192 N.E.2d 691 (2nd Dist. 1963).
125. These cases are exemplified by People ex rel. Gonzalez v. Monroe, 43 III. App. 2d 1, 192
N.E.2d 691 (2d Dist. 1963), in which the plaintiff brought a paternity action against the de-
fendant. In support of her allegation of paternity, she produced evidence that she and the
defendant had been involved in an extra-marital sexual relationship at the time of the child's
conception. The defendant introduced evidence that the plaintiff was married which raised the
presumption that the child was legitimate. In rebuttal, the plaintiff testified that she had sexual
relations with the defendant, but none with her husband, during the critical time frame. Her
testimony was uncontradicted and inherently credible. The court, however, refused to find that
this evidence rebutted the presumption. It reasoned that the legitimacy presumption was de-
veloped "for the purpose of preserving family stability and protecting helpless infants from the
stigma of illegitimacy." Id. at 6, 192 N.E.2d at 693. Thus, the presumption was conclusive, but
could be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Courts have found this presump-
tion rebutted where the evidence shows the impossibility of the husband having been the
father. See, e.g., Robinson v. Ruprecht, 191 I11. 424, 61 N.E. 631 (1901) (husband and wife
lived apart and the wife believed that lie was dead).
126. 65 II1. 2d at 100, 357 N.E.2d at 1130.
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determine what instruction, if any, to use once a presumption has
been raised. This implies that trial courts should conduct an indi-
vidualized presumption-by-presumption analysis. While this is a de-
sirable approach because it focuses the analysis upon the particular
case and encourages reasoned conclusions, the discretionary use of
instructions suggested by Diederich is inconsistent with the bursting
bubble theory adopted by the court. 127  Under that theory, the in-
troduction of contrary evidence destroys the presumption and an in-
struction regarding the presumption would be improper. 128 On the
other hand, where the presumption has not been overcome, an in-
struction is mandatory. 129
Although the supreme court noted several factors 130 which should
be analyzed when determining whether a presumption instruction
should be given, it never explained the interrelationship of these fac-
tors. In addition, the court neglected to assign values to them or to
give any indication as to whether some type of balancing test was
necessary. Because the court has failed to set guidelines for this dis-
cretionary use of instructions, future courts have no indication of how
to properly exercise this discretion.
The greatest flaw in the Diederich decision, however, results from
the court's misapplication of the presumption raised by the plaintiff's
evidence. Diederich recognized that the decedent's young age raised
the presumption that he lacked the capacity for negligence.' 3 '
Where a child lacks capacity the question of negligence never arises
although the child might have acted in a manner which would other-
wise be characterized as negligent. 132
By focusing attention upon the general function of presumptions,
the Diederich court did not analyze the nature of the child's pre-
sumption.13 3 Because of this omission, it sustained the trial court's
127. Id. at 102-103, 357 N.E.2d at 1131-32.
128. See note 59 and accompanying text supra. See also Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 I11.
539, 173 N.E. 670 (1930) (an instruction was not proper where the defendant produced evi-
dence contrary to the res ipsa loquitur presumption).
129. See also McElroy v. Force, 38 Ill. 2d 528, 232 N.E.2d 708 (1967) (where presumption
was not rebutted, it was essential to inform the jury of the presumption).
130. See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
131. 65 I11. 2d at 103, 357 N.E.2d at 1132. See note 105 supra.
132. See generally Note, Contributory Negligence of Children 18 S.C. L. REV. 648 (1966);
Note, Torts-Minors-Contributory or Comparative Negligence, 39 TENN. L. REV. 747,
748-49 (1972).
133. This presumption was created because courts generally believe that children do not
possess the same capacity as adults to recognize and avoid danger. See, e.g., Chicago and Alton
HR. v. Backer, 76 Ill. 25 (1875). Although other courts had recognized the distinction between
children's and adults' capacity in a criminal context, the Illinois Supreme Court in Wolczek v.
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rebuttal of the presumption upon evidence that the decedent violated
a traffic statute. Consequently, the court determined that young
Diederich had been contributorily negligent without ever considering
his individual capacity for negligence.' 34
IV. THE PRESUMPTION-BY-PRESUMPTION THEORY: A PROPOSAL
FOR A MORE RATIONAL TREATMENT OF PRESUMPTIONS
Had the supreme court adopted the presumption-by-presumption
approach, it would have alleviated the problems encountered both in
Diederich and past decisions. 135 That theory represents the better
approach because it directs the attention of the court away from pre-
Public Serv., 342 Ill. 482, 174 N.E. 577 (1931), was the first court to establish the presumption
in tort cases.
The plaintiff in Wolczek, an eleven year old, received an electric shock and burns when he
climbed upon the defendant's high voltage electric line tower. The tower was located in an
unguarded and unfenced forest preserve where children played. The court examined the child's
testimony and highlighted the following points concerning the child's capacity: (1) he did not
know the tower was dangerous, (2) he had not seen any signs warning him of the danger nor
was he told by anyone of the dangerousness of the structure, (3) he did not know anything
about electricity although he had ridden the electric street car.
The Wolczek court's reasoning for adopting this age-based presumption for negligence cases
centered upon its concern for the child's lower level of experience, intelligence and under-
standing. It found that the special standard of care in Illinois did not insure enough considera-
tion for the average child's deficiences. The court, noting that Illinois courts had expressed the
policy of treating children between the ages of seven and fourteen in a special manner, implied
that only the use of the presumption assured that treatment. Id. at 493, 174 N.E. at 582. For
an excellent survey of the Illinois treatment of children's contributory negligence. See Annot.,
174 A.L.R. 1080, 1111 (1948).
When this presumption is raised, two separate issues of fact exist: capacity and negligence.
American Nat'l Bank v. Pennsylvania R.R., 52 I11. App. 2d 406, 202 N.E.2d 79 (1st Dist. 1964),
aff'd, 35 Ill. 2d 145, 219 N.E.2d 529 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1035 (1967). The appellate
court decision, which was adopted by the supreme court, accepted the distinction between
these two concepts. 52 111. App. 2d at 425, 202 N.E.2d at 89. To determine whether the
presumption will operate, courts concentrate their attention on the child's capacity, experience,
and intelligence. See Hughes v. Mendendorp, 294 Ill. App. 424, 429, 13 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (1st
Dist. 1938). The presumption can be overcome by offering evidence of all the factors which may
be provided by his or her parents, teachers or friends. On the other hand, in order to deter-
mine whether the child has been negligent, courts examine the child's actions. See Wilkens,
Contributory Negligence of Very Young Children, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 65, 68 (1971).
134. 65 I11. 2d at 103, 357 N.E.2d at 1132. See Shaver v. Berrill, 45 Ill. App. 3d 906, 358
N.E.2d 290 (2d Dist. 1976). The Shaver court appears to adopt the reasoning in Diederich.
However, it does indicate that proof of the child's intelligence rather than the child's negligence
serves to rebut the presumption. Id. at 908, 358 N.E.2d at 292. The Shaver decision suggests
that the issue of whether the presumption has been rebutted is one for the trial judge. It is
unclear whether the issues were totally briefed in Shaver. In any case, because the appeal
revolved around a confusing special interrogatory, the court's discussion of presumptions consti-
tuted dicta.
135. The dissent in Diederich also suggests an acceptance of the presumption-by-presumption
approach. See note 114 supra.
PRESUMPTIONS
sumptions generally and towards the particular presumption at issue.
Focus on the individual case restricts the tendency of courts to rely
on dicta rather than analysis to assign procedural effect. In addition,
under this theory courts are more likely to identify the correct type of
evidence that could negate the presumption. Moreover, this approach
reflects the current practice since Illinois decisions have looked at the
purpose of some presumptions in order to assign procedural effect.136
The presumption-by-presumption approach admittedly is very
complex because it dictates that the presumption field develop on a
case by case basis. However, this poses no unusual burdens upon
courts. Indeed, any difficulties experienced by using this approach
would not be prohibitive in light of the fact that it would eventually
guarantee an end to the confusion.
V. CONCLUSION
The Illinois courts apparently have adopted the bursting bubble
procedural effect for all presumptions. However, in practice, courts
have rejected the theory as a comprehensive guide, because this ap-
proach fails to provide sufficient flexibility for use with all presump-
tions. The Diederich court attempted to follow both the theory and
the practice of the past Illinois presumption cases. By so doing, it
produced an illogical and inconsistent decision.
Courts must no longer accept the generalization that the bursting
bubble approach is the exclusive procedural effect for Illinois pre-
sumptions. Instead, Illinois' courts should adopt the presump-
tion-by-presumption theory in order to attain rational decisions. Only
an individualized analysis of both the nature and procedural effect of
a particular presumption will guarantee that a presumption will pro-
duce its intended result. Acceptance of this theory will not wreak
havoc upon the courts. Rather, adoption of the presumption-by-pre-
sumption theory will serve to merge theory and practice. Presump-
tions are too important an evidentiary device to deserve less.
Joanne F. Hurley
136. See, e.g., People ex rel. Gonzalez v. Monroe, 43 I11. App. 2d 1, 192 N.E.2d 691 (2d
Dist. 1963); Brenton v. Sloan's Storage & Van Co., 315 I11. App. 278, 42 N.E.2d 945 (4th Dist.
1942); Ashley Wire Co. v. Illinois Steel Co., 164 II1. 149 (1896). In Gonzalez the court's assign-
ment of the clear and convincing requirement resulted from a promotion of social policy. In the
bailee cases like Brenton, the court's recognition that a plaintiff was not in a good position to
prove negligence resulted in the court's decision to require the bailee to rebut the bailor's
presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. In Ashley the court's concern with the acces-
sibility of the parties to information concerning the action led the court to decide that the
defendant's evidence should overcome the presumption only if the jury found it credible.
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